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INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYER TAX COSTS AND WORKER BENEFITS OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: A MICRO-SIMULATION APPROACH
ABSTRACT
This study compares employer unemployment insurance (UI) tax costs and 
worker UI benefits across the 28 largest industrial states for 1988. The 
comparison is done using a detailed computerized micro-simulation model which 
computes the worker UI benefits and employer UI taxes for each state. 
Assumed characteristics of employers and employees are held constant across 
the states so that differences in UI costs and benefits among the states can 
be attributed entirely to differences in UI statutes. The principal findings 
of this study are: (1) the UI system can be modeled fruitfully at the firm 
level, (2) there are significant UI tax differentials across states 
attributable to statutory provisions, (3) UI tax differentials vary by type 
of employer, and (4) there is at least one significant regional difference: 
UI taxes are generally lower in Southern states.
I. Introduction
There has recently been a resurgence of interest in the role that state 
and local taxes play in firm location decisions and industrial growth. The 
conventional wisdom is that import competition and the general slowdown in 
the national rate of economic growth in the last decade has induced firms to 
locate in areas with low production costs. Meanwhile, new technology and the 
decline in transportation costs has substantially increased the number of 
locations which might potentially be cost-efficient. The federal government 
has exacerbated the problem, albeit unintentionally, by lowering marginal tax 
rates effectively increasing the significance of existing state and local tax 
differentials while simultaneously reducing the share of federal revenue 
returned to state and local governments. The bottom line is that states find 
themselves strapped for funds at the same time that interstate tax 
competition to attract and retain business firms has intensified. At a 
recent symposium sponsored by the National Tax Association, John Shannon, the
past Executive Director of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations suggested, "...it is time to take a hard new look at this tough old 
issue. " '-
It has been almost three decades since the frequently referenced survey 
on state and local taxes by John Due (1961) . In that article Due concluded 
that state and local taxes are relatively unimportant as a site location 
factor and therefore ineffective as a regional economic development policy 
tool. It has only been recently that a number of academic economists have 
challenged the view that state and local taxes are irrelevant to business 
decision making. These studies have been reviewed by Newman and Sullivan 
(1988) and McGuire (1986). Whatever the final result of the current debate 
about the role of state and local taxes, John Due's seminal work has 
certainly been strongly challenged.
This paper explores one of the taxes which has heretofore received 
little attention in the research literature on state and local tax 
differentials; namely, unemployment insurance (UI). UI provides temporary 
benefits to covered workers during periods of involuntary unemployment from 
taxes contributed by employers. Established in 1935 by the Social Security 
Act, the UI system is a cooperative federal-state program in which the states 
retain broad discretionary powers to determine the specifics of their 
individual programs. Consequently, the UI system varies widely by state. 
One of the complicating features of the state systems is the feedback 
mechanism whereby UI taxes at the firm level are partly experience rated, 
meaning that the layoff record of the firm impacts taxes due and payable.
Wheaton (1983) is one of the few researchers that includes UI taxes in 
his study of total state and local tax differentials. In his study aggregate 
UI tax data by state is utilized to approximate UI taxes for all businesses. 
The share of total UI taxes paid by the manufacturing sector in each state is 
also estimated using that sector's share of wages to total state wages. 
Wheaton's approach or any other similar approach which relies on aggregate UI 
tax data has serious limitations. UI taxes are neither assessed uniformly on 
firms in any state, nor are they computed by any simple function of firm 
wages and unemployment. Furthermore, UI taxes statewide can be pushed upward 
because of high unemployment in a few key sectors, while some employers may 
be relatively unaffected because of experience rating provisions.
An earlier study by Barron and Mellow (1981) suggested that differences 
in UI benefits per worker across states are indicative of differences in UI 
taxes for employers. They used data from the special May 1976 CPS supplement
o
designed to gather information on job search by the unemployed^- to estimate 
the probability that an unemployed person would collect UI and the expected 
UI benefit amount across 26 areas which included 18 states, 7 regional 
groupings of states, and the District of Columbia. This approach allowed 
them to capture the effect of eligibility enforcement standards. However, 
for the purpose of studying differences in interstate UI tax costs, their 
approach like Wheaton's suffers from the failure to directly consider the 
actual tax costs which result under the complicated UI tax regimes of the 
various states. Barron and Mellow (1981) state that a "direct analysis of
these differences is not possible: parameters of specific UI programs are 
complex and difficult to quantify."
The limited goal here is to attack this well-known measurement problem 
inherent in studying UI, a necessary precursor to linking UI to business 
decision making. Specifically, a simulation model is developed which is then 
used to compare the total impact of the detailed 1988 UI statutes on employer 
costs and worker benefits across the 28 largest industrial states for 
similarly situated employers and employees. In Section II the design of the 
study is presented. Simulation results for worker benefits are discussed in 
Section III, and employer cost results are given in Section IV. Finally, 
conclusions are offered in Section V.
The principal findings of this study are: (1) the UI system can be 
modeled fruitfully at the firm level, (2) there are significant UI tax 
differentials across states attributable to statutory provisions, (3) UI tax 
differentials vary by type of employer, and (4) there is at least one 
significant regional difference: UI taxes are generally lower in Southern 
states.
II. Design of the Study
The maintained hypothesis of this paper is that meaningful interstate 
comparison of UI costs for employers requires firm level analysis. We follow 
the approach that Papke and Papke (1984) utilize in their innovative AFTAX 
simulation model. They examine a variety of state and local taxes for
representative firms (using industry data) wherein the assumed 
characteristics of those firms are identical across states for all non-tax 
factors. Thus, any differences in the state and local taxes measured are due 
to statutory differences. UI is not included in their research due to the 
difficulties of measurement.
The notion of our UI micro-simulation model (UIMSM) is simple: to 
reproduce as closely as possible the actual process by which an operating 
firm's UI taxes are -determined in each state. In other words, UIMSM isolates 
the differences in UI costs among the states that can be directly attributed 
to differences in their UI statutes, holding constant the assumed 
characteristics of the employers and employees. The focus of UIMSM is 
squarely on the role that current statutes play in determining UI tax 
differentials across states. This approach appeals to policy makers who 
consider historical studies suspect due to rapidly changing economic and 
legal circumstances. Another attractive feature of UIMSM to policy makers is 
that it can be used to determine the differential impacts across firms of a 
given change in statutory provisions in one or more states.
Currently UIMSM contains the UI statutory provisions for calendar year 
1988 for 28 states. The 28 states included in this study are the largest
o
states in the U.S. in terms of manufacturing employment. Cumulatively, they 
accounted for just over 90 percent of all U.S. manufacturing employment in 
1987. It is, of course, impossible in a short paper to detail the specific 
state statutory provisions currently programmed in UIMSM because of the 
complexities in and differences among the state UI statutes. However, the
significant features of the model are presented in Appendix A, where common 
approaches and UI tax parameters are emphasized.
At the micro-level the layoff experience and wage rates of the firm are 
the principal determinants of UI costs. Therefore, two key variables 
characterize a hypothetical firm in this study: the insured unemployment rate 
and the average annual wage level. Nine basic simulations are conducted for 
an employer with a given workforce using three separate wage levels and three 
separate firm unemployment rates in all possible combinations.
The five year, 1983-87, national average weekly insured unemployment 
rate of 2.9 percent is defined as average for this study, double that figure 
as high, and one-half of it as low. Average annual wages for this study are 
$20,200, this is the estimated national average wage for all UI covered 
workers in private employment in 1987. Estimated in a similar fashion, high 
average annual wages are $32,700, and low average annual wages are $11,300, 
these are the highest and lowest average annual wages for industries covered 
by UI data. The hypothetical firms considered in this study are therefore 
representative of actual industry data, and provide a broad range of wages 
and unemployment for the simulations.
It is important to understand what is being estimated with the 
simulation model. First, the total cost of benefit payments under the 1988 
statutory provisions is estimated rather than the actual UI tax bills for 
1988. Benefit payments during 1988 do not affect 1988 taxes, because current 
tax rates are a function of the firm's experience in prior years. However,
1988 benefit payments do affect future taxes through the experience rating 
system. Therefore, the full impact of UI in a given year is the total cost 
after all interim adjustments have taken place.
Second, this study focuses exclusively on the UI statutes actually in 
place and effective during 1988. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
evaluate legislated changes and automatic provisions for change that are 
scheduled to be effective in future years. Concomitantly, various so-called 
temporary or emergency taxes are included in this study because they are 
actually effective in 1988 regardless of the fact that they may expire at a 
future date.
Third, throughout this study total UI taxes include both the state and 
federal taxes payable in order to provide a more complete picture of the 
total UI tax burden faced by firms. Federal penalty taxes may also be due 
from employers in certain states with federal loans outstanding.
Finally, it should be emphasized that there is no simple way to 
aggregate the micro estimates from this study to arrive at statewide 
estimates of UI costs and benefits. Similarly, there is no reason to think 
that any one of the benefit or tax cost simulations is more significant than 
the others. In short, one should examine the general trends in UI tax costs 
and benefits across the simulations of this study rather than focus on the 
estimates from any individual simulation.
III. Worker Benefits
Weekly UI benefit payments provide covered workers with partial wage 
replacement during spells of unemployment. The weekly benefit in all states 
amounts to some fraction of prior wages up to a specified maximum. The 
number of weeks that a claimant can receive benefits is limited, and the 
claimant may also be subject to a waiting week, meaning that benefits are not 
paid during the first week of unemployment. Finally, there may be an 
allowance for dependents.
The UI benefit provisions vary widely among the states." The simulation 
model includes the detailed rules used by the states themselves to compute a 
claimant's benefits. The simulation model assumes that all workers are 
earning the average wage in their firm and that one-half of the workers are 
married with a working spouse and two dependents, except for low wage 
simulations where it is assumed that none of the workers have dependents. 
Furthermore, all workers are assumed to be eligible for the maximum duration 
of benefits and to actually apply for benefits if laid off. There is no 
specific accounting for state eligibility rules, generally stated in terms of 
weeks of work and some minimum earnings requirement. However, these criteria 
tend to be quite modest, even in states with more stringent qualifying 
requirements, so it is not a significant limitation, unless one is interested 
in studying firms in which the bulk of employees are part-timers and being
n
paid at or very near the federal minimum wage.
The model is highly stylized, accounting only for the most significant 
characteristics of state UI systems that affect individual benefit levels. 
The model does not include extended benefits, monetary and nonmonetary 
eligibility requirements, or special provisions for part-time workers, work- 
sharing, and seasonal workers, among others. Turnover is limited to that 
implied by the firm's unemployment rate. Thus, UIMSM is applicable only to 
firms with a stable work force and permanent on-going operations.
Table 1 presents the weekly benefit amounts calculated by the simulation 
model that correspond to low, average, and high wages. Because benefits are 
sensitive to dependency status in some states, weekly benefit amounts for 
average and high wage workers are listed for those with no dependents and 
those with two dependents. Simulated weekly benefit amounts which are at the 
state maximum are indicated with an asterisk. Also given in Table 1 are 
index numbers and rankings of weekly benefit amounts across the 28 states.
For the low wage simulations the weekly benefit amount ranges from $96 
in Indiana and Tennessee to $141 in Oregon. The variation in benefit amount 
across states is smaller for the low wage level than for average or high 
wages. The weekly benefit amount is $108 in 8 states, and 13 states have a 
weekly benefit amount in the range $107 to $109. The mean weekly benefit 
amount for the low wage group is $113 with a standard deviation of 10.3. 
Among the low wage simulations, the maximum weekly benefit amount is paid in 
only one state, Indiana. These results confirm the generally accepted notion 
that below the maximum weekly benefit amount UI benefits replace roughly one- 
half of the worker's previous wages, yet the rather significant outliers also





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a Wages: Low - $11,300, Average - $20,200, High - 32,700.
b WBA is weekly benefit amount.
c The numbers in parentheses are the states rank relative to the average of all 28 states in the study.
rankings are ordered from high to low. 
* An asterisk indicates the weekly benefit is at the state maximum.
In this paper
demonstrate the dangers of applying rules of thumb carte blanche to state 
statutory systems.
The bigger differences across states in benefits for the average and 
high wage simulations are due primarily to the maximum WBA limitation. For 
the high wage simulations with two dependents the weekly benefit amount 
ranges from $120 in Alabama to $302 in Massachusetts, the state maximum 
benefit ceilings are binding for all high wage simulations. For simulations 
with no dependents, ceiling benefit amounts are paid in only one state 
(Indiana) given low wages, 14 states given average wages, and all states 
given high wages. A review of Table 1 should leave no doubt that identically 
situated workers in terms of wages and dependency status receive much 
different benefits depending on the state in which they are located.
IV. Employer Costs
Employers pay two types of taxes to finance the UI system. Federal UI 
taxes fund all of the administrative expenses of the federal-state UI system. 
This includes the direct administration of UI and the provision of a variety 
of employment-related services through the state employment security 
agencies. The federal UI taxes also support one-half the cost of extended 
benefits and the federal loan account from which states may borrow to pay 
worker benefits should the state UI trust fund be exhausted.
One portion of each employer's state UI tax is related to layoff 
experience. There may also be one or more additional uniform tax or other
11
variable charges. These additional taxes might help fund benefit payments to 
workers whose firms no longer exist or whose firms are already subject to the 
maximum permissible state tax rates. Some states may also wish to more 
aggressively replenish state reserves that have become depleted during a 
period of high unemployment.
The individual state UI tax structures, especially their experience 
rated elements, are complex and differ considerably across the states. The 
simulation model incorporates the detailed tax provisions, specific tax 
schedules, and computation methods used to compute an employer's tax rate in 
the various states. Among other features, the tax calculations include the 
charging provisions for each element of the tax, the lag between the data 
available on tax computation dates and the effective dates of those rates, 
rounding provisions, the effects of the waiting week on employer costs, 
write-down procedures and tax limiters. In the simulation model, the 
employer's UI record is maintained as would the states themselves to 
facilitate the iteration of the model for any number of one-year periods. 
The ability to iterate the model is one of its advantages, permitting the 
determination of the total impact of the UI system on employer costs.
While the simulation model incorporates most of the complex state tax 
provisions it is not complete. The model deals only with the general state 
tax rates, ignoring any special rate provisions for particular types of 
employers by size, industry, or other factors. It also does not include the 
special tax provisions for new firms. Benefit charges for extended
12
benefits are not modeled, nor is there any specific accounting for each 
state's noncharging provisions or appeal procedures.
Simulations were performed for all nine combinations of three different 
levels of unemployment and three levels of wages. UI tax cost estimates are 
presented as index numbers together with rankings in Table 2. The highest 
tax cost states are Texas, Washington, Oregon, Minnesota, and Iowa. Among 
these Oregon is the only one also ranked near the top of the list in terms of 
weekly benefit amounts computed by the simulation model. Texas tax rates 
were high in the 1980s because the state UI trust fund had been nearly 
depleted. New Jersey is interesting in that UI tax costs and ranking are 
much lower at low unemployment rates than at higher unemployment rates.
Three of the top tax cost states Washington, Oregon, and Iowa are the 
only states among the 28 to be benefit ratio ranking states. Under this 
approach firms are ranked by benefit ratio, grouped so that each cluster 
contains the same proportion of the state's total UI taxable wage base, and 
then different tax rates are assigned to each group. Given that Oregon, 
Washington, and Iowa have had relatively low unemployment rates in recent 
years, a firm experiencing the insured unemployment rates simulated here, 
even those with an average IUR of 1.45, would be near the top of the state 
distribution, and therefore have high taxes, far higher than the benefit 
payments received by the workers in those firms. The implication is that a 
firm in a state with a benefit ratio ranking system may have UI tax costs 
that are more responsive to the overall state's unemployment record than the 
firm's own layoff record.
13
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Finally, there is at least one regional UI tax cost difference which 
should be mentioned. Omitting the three western states of California, 
Oregon, and Washington the remainder of the twenty-eight states can be 
readily grouped into two regions consisting of twelve southern states and 
thirteen northern states. *• The index of UI tax costs across the southern 
states averages 82.5, while it is 109.1 for the northern states. The average 
for the three omitted western states is 130.6, but it is unknown whether
these results are indicative of the entire western region. Nevertheless, it
i
is clear that UI tax costs are generally lower in the south, at least for the 
largest manufacturing states included in this study.
V. Conclusions
We conclude that the simulation model developed for this study is a step 
in the right direction for constructing more meaningful interstate 
comparisons of UI costs for employers. UIMSM is a detailed, computerized 
micro-simulation model which reproduces the manner in which both worker 
benefits and employer UI taxes are determined in each state. The total 
impact of the 1988 UI statutes is approximated, after all the provisions of 
the 1988 statutes are fully reflected in firm costs. Since the interstate 
comparisons are made for hypothetical situations in which the firm and worker 
characteristics are identical across states, differences in benefits and 
costs among the states in this study can be attributed entirely to 
differences in state UI statutes. Benefits were found to vary considerably 
across states for identically situated claimants. Similarly UI taxes for the
15
hypothetical firms considered also varied widely. Finally, it appears that 
UI taxes are generally lower in the southern states. The obvious conclusion 
is that the complicated state UI tax systems, heretofore ignored in most 
studies of state and local taxes, do indeed contribute to the overall state 
and local tax differentials of employers.
16
ENDNOTES
1. Shannon (1986), p. 339.
2. For a description of this data see Rosenfeld (1977).
3. In appendix Table B.I all states are ranked using manufacturing employment 
data.
4. This estimate results from applying expected wage growth for 
nonsupervisory workers as published in Employment and Earnings. U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 1988, to the annual average wage in UI covered 
employment as reported in News: Average Annual Pay by State and Industry. 
1986. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
5. The model is iterated for 20 periods (years) because UI taxes in some 
states with wide steps in their tax schedule may continue to fluctuate 
indefinitely. Thus, in this study a 20-period average of total UI tax costs 
is used to approximate the full impact of UI payments in a given year.
6. The benefit provisions for the 28 states in the simulation model are 
summarized in appendix Table B.2.
7. It is well-known that dependency status varies significantly with wage 
levels. In 1978, the last year for which data on dependency allowances are 
available from the UI system (U.S. Employment and Training Administration, 
1979:22-24), only about one-third of all beneficiaries claimed any dependents 
(in those states that had dependency allowances, of course), while that 
figure jumped to about one-half for workers receiving the maximum weekly 
benefit amount. Furthermore, of those workers claiming dependents, only 15 
percent had a dependent spouse, while 94 percent claimed from one to three 
total dependents. It turns out that at national average wages many workers 
qualify for near maximum benefit amounts. Thus, the wage/dependency 
combinations selected for this study are arbitrary but consistent with 
available data.
8. For instance, Michigan, which has one of the more stringent criteria, 
requires 20 credit weeks in the most recent 52 weeks, where a credit week is 
defined as $100.50 of earnings. That translates into 30 hours of work per 
week for 20 weeks for someone earning the federal minimum wage, for a total 
minimum earnings of $2,010. For higher wage workers Michigan also has an 
alternative earnings requirement for workers with at least 14 weeks of 
employment.
9. The general provisions for each state's experience rating system and any 
uniform rate additions for all 28 states in the simulation model are 
presented in appendix Table B. 3.
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10. Most states assign a new firm a given tax rate for a year or so and then 
phase in experience rating. Notice that the total impact of the UI system on 
new employers over time asymptotically approaches that for a permanent 
ongoing employer, exactly the type of firm which is included in the model.
11. It should be noted that no state paid extended benefits during 1988. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Service does not expect extended 
benefits to be paid in the near future (U.S. Employment and Training 
Administration, September 1987:2).
12. The southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia. The northern states are: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 




Barren, John M., and Wesley Mellow (1981), "Interstate Differences in
Unemployment Insurance," National Tax Journal. XXXIV (March): 105-13.
Commerce Clearing House (1988), Unemployment Insurance with Social Security. 
Commerce Clearing House, Chicago, Illinois.
Due, John F. (1961), "Studies of State-Local Tax Influences on Location of 
Industry," National Tax Journal XIV (June): 163-73.
Newman, Robert J., and Dennis H. Sullivan (1988), "Econometric Analysis of
Business Tax Impacts on Industrial Location: What Do We Know, and How Do 
We Know It?," Journal of Urban Economics. 23 (June): 215-234.
McGuire, Therese J. (1986), "Interstate Tax Differentials, Tax Competition, 
and Tax Policy," National Tax Journal. XXXIX (September): 367-73.
Papke, James A., and Leslie E. Papke (1984), "State Tax Incentives and
Investment Location Decisions: Microanalytic Simulations," in James A. 
Papke, editor, Indiana*s Revenue Structure: Malor Components and Issues. 
Part II, Purdue University, Center for Tax Policy Studies (March).
Rosenfeld, Carl (1977), "Job Search of the Unemployed, May 1976," Monthly 
Labor Review. 100 (November): 39-43.
Shannon, John (1986), "Interstate Tax Competition--The Need for a New Look," 
National Tax Journal XXXIX (September): 339-40.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1988), Employment and Earnings (various 
issues), U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
______________ (1987) , News: Average Annual Pay by State and Industry.
1986. USDC 87-377, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
U.S. Employment and Training Administration (1987a) Unemployment Insurance 
Financial Data. ET Handbook 394. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Labor.
______________ (1979), Unemployment Insurance Statistics. U.S. Department
of Labor, Washington, DC.
Wheaton, William C. (1983), "Interstate Differences in the Level of Business 




The purpose of this technical documentation is to summarize the general 
features of the individual state UI systems which are represented in the 
unemployment insurance micro-simulation model (UIMSM) . UIMSM is a structural 
model that closely reproduces the actual process by which a worker's benefits 
and an operating firm's UI taxes are determined in each state. In UIMSM the 
basic unit of observation is the firm on an annual basis. There are 28 
states in UIMSM. 1
UIMSM has three basic parts. The firm specific parameters which 
generally are common to all states are estimated first. Worker benefits and 
associated variables are then determined. Finally, the firm's tax 
contributions are estimated. In the following exposition, common approaches 
and parameters are emphasized at the expense of state specific statutory 
provisions because of the complexities in and differences among the state UI 
statutes.
Firm Specific Variables
There are two sets of exogenous variables in this first part of the 
model. One set of three variables defines the firm specific unemployment 
experience: average weekly insured unemployment rate (iu), average exhaustion
1 These 28 states are the largest in terms of manufacturing employment, 
cumulatively accounting for just over 90 percent of all manufacturing 
employment. The 28 states are: AL, AR, CA, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, IA, KY, MD, 
MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, NJ, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, AND WI.
rate (exh) and average duration of regular insured unemployment in weeks 
(DUR). Another pair of variables: average annual employment (AAE) and 
average weekly wage (AWW) , define the size and wage level of the firm. 
Throughout this presentation variables expressed as rates or proportions are 
identified by small letters, all other variables are labeled with capital 
letters.
It should be emphasized that the five exogenous variables listed above 
are drivers of the model. They may take on any value specified, say those 
from an actual firm or perhaps those based on national averages. By 
specifying the values of exogenous variables to be identical across the 
states, we isolate the role of statutes in explaining differences in 
important items like UI benefits, UI costs, and the degree of experience 
rating.
In UIMSM it is assumed that all unemployed workers are laid off 
involuntarily, they are eligible for the maximum duration of regular 
benefits, and they apply for UI benefits. UIMSM does not deal with extended 
benefits currently nor is there any other labor turnover besides the
o
employer's assumed layoff experience. Under these conditions, the total 
number of covered workers (TCW), the total weeks of unemployment (TWU), and 
the total number of covered workers who experience a spell of regular insured 
unemployment during the year (IU) are calculated as:
o
Except for the usual time and budget constraints, there is no reason 
why additional UI administrative provisions and other labor market conditions 
could not be incorporated in UIMSM.
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(1) TCW  = AAE -f- iu*AAE
(2) TWU - iu*AAE*52
(3) IU - TWU/DUR
Since the UI system taxes wages earned up to a specified limit (which 
itself varies across states), the number of employees who are full year 
workers (FYW), exhaustees (EXH), and nonexhaustees (NEXH) plus the average 
annual wages (AAW) of each group of workers are estimated separately as:
(4) FYW - TCW - IU
(5) EXH - exh*IU
(6)^NEXH - IU - EXH
(7) AAWpYw - AWW*52
(8) AAWgxH = AWW*25
(9) AAWNEXH - AWW*(52 - ((TWU - EXH*27)/NEXH))
An exhaustee is defined as a worker who experiences 27 weeks of regular 
insured unemployment (therefore working 25 weeks), because most states do not 
compensate the first week of regular insured unemployment, commonly called
iii
the waiting week, and thereafter pay a maximum of 26 weeks of regular
o
benefits. Note that this definition of an exhaustee is technically correct 
in states without a waiting week only if the worker does not find employment 
in the 27th week of unemployment.
Worker Benefits and Associated Variables
In general, weekly benefit amounts (WBA) are determined as some 
proportion, wr (the wage replacement ratio) , of AWW^ plus an allowance for 
dependents (DEP), when applicable, subject to a ceiling or maximum WBA (Max 
WBA). The typical relationship in state, s, for a worker with dependents, d, 
is
(10) WBAd>s - min{[wrd>s * AWW + DEPd>s ], Max WBAd>s )
WBA's are currently calculated for only two types of workers, one with 
no dependents (d«0) and the other with a working spouse and two dependents 
(d 2). Some states pay an absolute dollar amount for dependents (DEP>0), 
other states increase wr above what it would otherwise be for a single
o
J Massachusetts and Washington pay a maximum of 30 weeks of regular 
benefits.
For instance, it is common for states to replace l/26th of the 
worker's high quarter wages (13 weeks), making wr-0.5. In Michigan, wr is a 
function of after-tax earnings, defined as income after federal income taxes, 
state income taxes, and social security taxes. In Tennessee and California a 
table must be used to relate AWW and WBA.
5 This assumption is arbitrary, but 94 percent of workers with 
dependents claimed from one to three dependents in 1978, the last year for 
which data on dependents are available from the UI system (U.S. Employment 
and Training Administration, 1979:22-24).
iv
worker, and still other states raise the maximum WBA for workers with 
dependents leaving DEP 0 and wr unchanged.
The benefits charged (BC) to the firm are the product of the total weeks 
of unemployment compensated (TWUC) and the weekly benefits paid as follows:
(11) TWUCS - TWUS - EXH - WAITS*NEXH
(12) BCS - TWUCS * ((l-mar)*WBAo )S + mar*WBA2>s )
TWUC differs from TWU because there are certain weeks of regular insured 
unemployment that are not compensated and therefore should not be included in 
calculating benefits: one week for each nonexhaustee in states with a waiting 
week provision (WAIT) and one week for each exhaustee in all states (the 
first week in waiting week states and the twenty-seventh week in nonwaiting 
week states). The last term in equation (12) weights the WBA's in states 
with dependency allowances to reflect the proportion of the firm's workforce 
which is married with two dependents (mar). For the states which have no 
dependency allowances, of course, WBA0 s   WBA2 s .
Finally the total taxable wage base (TTWB) of the firm is the sum of the
For most simulations it is assumed that one-half of the unemployed 
workers are married with a working spouse and two dependents. Note that at 
national average wages most workers qualify for maximum or near maximum 
benefit amounts, and that the most recently available UI data (Employment and 
Training Administration, 1979: 22-24) show that nearly one-half of workers 
receiving the maximum weekly benefit amount also claim dependents. Thus, it 
is arbitrary but reasonable to initially set mar=0.5.
v
wages of the three different types of workers subject to an upper limit on 
the wages taxable for each worker (TWB) specified by statute in each state.
TTWBS - FYW*min{AAWFYw, TWBS ) +
(13) EXH^nmintAAWEXH, TWBS ) + 
NEXH*min{AAWNEXH, TWBS )
Tax Contributions
Employers pay federal and state UI taxes. A minimum federal tax rate 
(fx) is imposed on all employers nationwide plus a penalty tax rate (px) may 
be imposed on employers in certain states which have loans outstanding from 
the federal loan fund. All federal taxes are payable on the total federal 
taxable wage base of the firm (TTWBF) subject to an upper limit on the 
taxable wage base per worker (TWBF) similar to TWBS . Total state UI taxes, 
of course, are the product of the state tax rate (tx) and TTWB from equation 
(13). Thus, total federal and state UI taxes (UITX) are obtained as
(14) UITXS - fx*TTWBF + px*TTWBF + txs*TTWBs
' Total UI taxes include both the federal and state components of the 
tax to capture the total costs of the cooperative federal-state program and 
to properly account for the interdependence of the system.
  Per federal statutory provisions the penalty tax rate (px) rises 
annually for all employers in states with loans from the federal loan fund. 
By meeting certain conditions, however, and paying an equivalent sum from 
state trust funds, debtor states can qualify their employers for a zero 
penalty rate, effectively redistributing a non-experience rated tax (px > 0) 
to the state experience rating system. The manner in which a state chooses 
to discharge its obligation to the federal loan fund can have significant 
differential impacts on employers across states.
VI
The state UI tax rate of an employer (txs ) is far more complicated than 
its federal counterpart. It consists of an experience rated component, 
meaning that the layoff experience of the firm at least partially influences 
the tax rate, and generally a non-experience rated component. The two most 
common approaches to experience rating are the benefit ratio method and the 
reserve ratio method.
The benefit ratio system uses a moving average of the past n years of BC 
relative to TTWB to determine the firm's basic benefit ratio (br) . The most 
recent benefit ratio available for rate making would theoretically be, 
brt _]_, but there is a further lag in months, m, (stated as a part-year 
proportion in UIMSM) , in most states between the computation date and the 
effective date for new rates. ^ The basic benefit ratio for rate making, 
brt _i_ms , may be multiplied by a statewide adjustment factor (adj), there may 
be one or more statewide additional taxes (ADD) , and there may be a maximum 
allowable change in the tax rate (Max A txs ). Finally, the total state UI 
tax rate (tx) is subject to a statutory maximum (Max tx) in all states. *• 
The following two equations summarize a typical benefit-ratio system where t
" Michigan and Pennsylvania actually have combined reserve ratio- 
benefit ratio systems. Two states in the model, Alabama and Illinois, 
utilize the benefit-wage ratio method.
*-® BC and TTWB are not necessarily lagged the same number of months, ms, 
within a state. A few states either do not use January 1 as the effective 
date for new rates or compute rates more than once a year.
*-*- The maximum tax rate may be applicable to the state's overall tax 
rate or to its components.
Vll
is the current calendar year and k is the total number of constant additions 






(16) txs - adj s*brs t_i-ms + 2 ADDS -;
J-1
(17) A txs - min{A[adj s*brSjt_;L_ ms + s ADDs j], Max A txs)
The key feature of a reserve ratio system is that an experience rating 
account (ERA) is maintained for each employer which reflects the cumulative 
past experience of that employer, measured as total tax contributions made 
(TTCA) less BC. The firm's reserve ratio (rr) for rate making purposes is 
computed as its ERA relative to its TTWB of the last n years with a lag, m, 
like a benefit ratio system. A state schedule of rates (SCH) is then 
consulted wherein firms within specified ranges of rr pay identical tax 
rates. ^ The firm's final tax rate may be subject to adjustment factors, one 
or more additions to the basic tax rate, etc., all like a benefit ratio 
system. Finally, a reserve ratio state may allow the writedown or partial 
elimination of the negative balance in the ERA. The following equations 
summarize a typical reserve ratio system:
In Wisconsin ADD is itself a function of SCH(rr) .
VLll
(18) ERAStt _!_ms - (BCS , t_i.ms ) ]
(19) rrSft .i.ms Max{
ERAs,t-l-ms
n
S TTWBS)t>i _ ms
, min rrs )
(20) txs - min{[adj s*SCHs (rrSft . 1 .ms) + S ADDs j], Max txs )
(21) A txs = min {A[adj s*SCHs (rrs>t-i-ms ) + S ADD S 4 ] , Max A txs )
J-l
Since UIMSM does not deal with the past UI statutes, the model is 
initialized prior to any simulation by finding the taxes due and payable 
given fixed values for the key drivers of the model. -* Thus, the firm is in 
a steady state at the beginning of the simulation period. It should also be 
noted that currently the model does not project future aggregate conditions, 
so statewide parameters like adj s and ADDS do not change during the 
simulation period, even though in reality these variables are frequently tied 
to the cumulative experience of all employers in the state. In other words, 
UIMSM focuses on the total impact of the statutory tax structure in force in 
a given year rather than speculating about future conditions.
*••* For convenience the initialization takes place over 10 periods, 
although it is obvious that in a benefit ratio state that no more than n 
periods are actually required. Since tax rates may continue to fluctuate 
indefinitely between two steps of the tax schedule in reserve ratio states, 
even with a stable AWW and IUR, UITX is generally computed as the annual 
























































Source: Employment and Earnings,










































































































May, 1988.   .     
States in capital letters have been included in this study.
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Table B.2.
SELECTED BENEFIT PROVISIONS OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS




Waiting Duration Amount-'- Computation of Weekly Benefit 

































































1/24 of high quarter wages
1/52 of sum of two highest quarter wages
1/24 to 1/33 of high quarter wages
1/26 of high quarter wages plus $10 per 
dependent up to $50 maximum
50% of average weekly wages
1/50 of sum of two highest quarter wages
49% of average weekly wages in highest two 
quarters, 8% additional for non-working 
spouse or 15% for one or more dependent 
children, whichever greater
4.3% of high quarter wages
1/19 to 1/23 high quarter wages varying with 
dependents
1.185% of annual wages
1/24 of high quarter wages plus $8 per 
dependent up to $32 maximum
1/21 to 1/26 of high quarter wages plus $25 
per dependent up to 50% of weekly benefit
amount
70% of average weekly after- tax earnings '
1/26 of high quarter wages
1/26 of high quarter wages






Waiting Duration Amount^ Computation of Weekly Benefit
State Week (weeks) (dollars) Amount up to Maximum Levels
New Jersey 26 241
New York 1 














60% of average weekly wages in high quarter 
plus 7% of weekly benefit amount for first 
dependent and 4% each for the next two 
dependents
50% of average weekly wages 
1/52 of sum of two highest quarter wages 
50% of average weekly wages in high quarter 
1.25% of annual wages
1/23 to 1/25 plus $2-$3 of high quarter 
wages. Dependency allowance of $5 for first 
dependent and $3 for the second one. Weekly 
benefit entitlements are reduced by 5% in 

























50% of average weekly wages in high quarter
1/25 to 1/33 of the average of the two 
highest quarter wages
1/25 of high quarter wages
1/50 of sum of two highest quarter wages
1/25 of average of two highest quarter wages
50% of average weekly wages in high quarter
Source: Based on data from the employment security agencies of the individual 
states and the U.S. Department of Labor.
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Table B.2.--Continued
1 Range shows maximum weekly benefit amount for a worker with no dependents and 
a worker with maximum dependents allowable.
o
^ Estimated using the projections of the employment security agencies of the 
individual states and/or unpublished UI wage data from the U.S. Department of 
Labor; effective in July for Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, South Carolina, 
and Washington, in August for North Carolina, and in October for Massachusetts.
^ No waiting week if claimant unemployed not through own fault.
^ The waiting week is compensable in Minnesota at the fixed rate of $20 when a 
claimant returns to work, provided benefits have been paid for at least four 
weeks; it is compensable in Missouri after nine consecutive weeks of 
unemployment, after three weeks of benefits are payable in New Jersey and 
Texas.
 * After-tax earnings are approximated per schedule determined by commission to 
be a reasonable approximation of applicable federal and state income taxes, 
social security taxes, and exemptions.
  Michigan does not have a dependency allowance per se, but dependents increase 
the number of federal exemptions allowable, thereby increasing after-tax 
earnings and weekly benefits payable.
' After statutory reduction of weekly benefit entitlement of 5 percent.
xiv
Table B.3.

















































































































































































































Source: Based on data from the employment security agencies of the 
individual states and the U.S. Department of Labor.
BWR - Benefit Wage Ratio 
RR = Reserve Ratio 
BR - Benefit Ratio
Note: Footnotes follow on subsequent page.
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Table B.3. Footnotes
•*- Michigan and Pennsylvania also include a reserve ratio in computing a 
portion of the tax rate.
9   '*• The rate additions apply only to positive balance employers in California 
and South Carolina (1.05%).
o
J The rate additions cannot increase the maximum experience tax rates in 
Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, and South Carolina, or minimum and maximum tax 
rates in Georgia.
^ The rate addition does not increase the tax rate unless, when combined with 
other rating factors, the sum thereof rounds to the next highest one-tenth of 
one percent. The minimum tax rate is .IX.
-* There is also a variable, additional tax in North Carolina (0.002 to 1.14%) 
and Texas (0.64% to 2%) that is determined from the employer's basic 
experience tax rate. In Wisconsin a variable additional rate of 0.43% to 
1.70% applies to employers with total payroll in excess of $200,000; for 
firms with smaller payrolls the variable additional rate ranges from 0.00% to 
1.20%.
" Tax rates do not include employee taxes in New Jersey (.625%) and 
Pennsylvania (.1%).
' In Illinois for employers with quarterly payrolls less than $50,000 and 
regular UI tax rates of 5.1% or higher the maximum tax is 5.0%.
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